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Abstract
The analysis of markets with indivisible goods and fixed exogenous prices has played
an important role in economic models, especially in relation to wage rigidity and unemploy-
ment. This paper provides a novel mathematical programming based approach to study pure
exchange economies where discrete amounts of commodities are exchanged at fixed prices.
Barter processes, consisting in sequences of elementary reallocations of couple of commodi-
ties among couples of agents, are formalized as local searches converging to equilibrium
allocations. A direct application of the analyzed processes in the context of computational
economics is provided, along with a Java implementation of the approaches described in this
paper: http://www-eio.upc.edu/~nasini/SER/launch.html.
Key words: Microeconomic Theory, Combinatorial optimization, Multiobjective
optimization, Multiagent systems
1. Introduction
The bargaining problem concerns the allocation of a fixed quantity among a set of self-
interested agents. The characterizing element of a bargaining problem is that many alloca-
tions might be simultaneously suitable for all the agents.
Definition 1. Let V ⊂ Rn be the space of allocations of an n agents bargaining problem.
Points in V can be compared by saying that v∗ ∈ V strictly dominates v ∈ V if each component
of v∗ is not less than the corresponding component of v and at least one component is strictly
greater, that is, vi ≤ v∗i for each i and vi < v∗i for some i. This is written as v ≺ v∗. Then,
the Pareto frontier is the set of points of V that are not strictly dominated by others.
Since the very beginning of the Economic Theory [13, 10], the bargaining problem has
generally be adopted as the basic mathematical framework for the study of markets of exclud-
able and rivalrous goods and a long-standing line of research focused on axiomatic approaches
for the determination of a uniquely allocation, satisfying agent’s interests (for details, see
Nash [15] and Rubinstein [19]).
More recently, an increasing attention has been devoted to the cases where the quantity
to be allocated is not infinitesimally divisible. The technical difficulties associated to those
markets have been pointed out since Shapley and Shubik [22], who characterized the equi-
libria of markets where each agent can consume at most one indivisible good. After them,
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many authors have been studying markets with indivisible goods (see for example, Kaneko
[14], Quinzii [18], Scarf [21], and the most recent literature like Danilov et al. [8], Caplin
and Leahy [6]). The main focus was to address the question of existence of market clearing
prices in the cases of not infinitesimally divisible allocations.
Another subclass of the family of bargaining problems is associated to markets with fixed
prices (for details, see Dreze [9] and Auman and Dreze [3]), which have played an important
role in maroeconomic models, especially on those models related to wage rigidities and
unemployment. Dreze [9] described price rigidity as inequality constraints on individual
prices.
Efficient algorithms to find non-dominated Pareto allocations of bargaining problems
associated to markets with not infinitesimally divisible goods and fixed exogenous prices have
been recently studied by Vazirani et al. [24] and by Ozlen, Azizoglu and Burton [17]. Our goal
is to provide novel mathematical-programming based approaches to analyze barter processes,
which are commonly used in everyday life by economic agents to solve bargaining problems
associated to n-consumer-m-commodity markets of not infinitesimally divisible goods and
fixed exogenous prices. These processes are based on elementary reallocations (ER) of two
commodities among two agents, sequentially selected from the m(m− 1)n(n− 1)/4 possible
combinations. Under fixed prices, markets do not clear and the imbalance between supply
and demand is resolved by some kind of quantity rationing [9]. In out analysis this quantity
rationing is implicit in the process and not explicitly taken into account.
Based on this multi-agent approach, many economical systems might be simulated [26],
as we will see in the computational application illustrated in section 5.
Section 2 illustrates the fundamental properties of the allocation space. Section 3 provides
a general mathematical programming formulation and derives an analytical expression for
the Pareto frontier of the elementary reallocation problem (ERP). It will be shown that the
sequence of elementary reallocations (SER) (the chain of ERP performed by agents along the
interaction process) follows the algorithmic steps of a local search in the integer allocation
space with exogenous prices. Section 4 introduce the case of network structures restricting
agents interactions to be performed only among adjacent agents. In section 5 the performance
of these barter processes is compared with the one of a global optimization algorithm (branch
and cut).
2. The integer allocation space with exogenous prices
The key characteristic of an economy is: a collection A of n agents, a collection C of
m types of commodities, a commodity space X (usually represented by the nonnegative
orthant in Rm), the initial endowments eij ∈ X for i ∈ A, j ∈ C (representing a budget of
initial amount of commodities owned by each agent), a preference relation i on X for each
agent i ∈ A. Arrow and Debreu [2] showed that if the set {(x, y) ∈ X × X : x i y} is
closed relative to X×X the preference relation can be represented by a real-valued function
ui : X 7−→ R, such that, for each a and b belonging to X, ui(a) 6 ui(b) if and only if a  b.
When agents attempt to simultaneously maximize their respective utilities, conditioned to
balance constraints, the resulting problems are maxui(x) s.to
∑
i∈A x
i
j =
∑
i∈A e
i
j for j ∈ C,
where xij ∈ X, is the amount of commodity j demanded by agent i (from now on the
superindex shall denote the agent and the subindex shall denote the commodity).
Arrow and Debreu [2] showed that under certain economic conditions (convex prefer-
ences, perfect competition and demand independence) there must be a vector of prices
P̂ = (p̂1, p̂2, p̂3, . . . , p̂m)
T , such that aggregate supplies will equal aggregate demands for
every commodity in the economy.
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As studied by Drze (1975) and by Auman and Drze (1986), when prices are regarded as
fixed, markets do not clear and the imbalance between supply and demand is resolved by
some kind of quantity rationing. The system of linear constraints associated a n-consumer-
m-commodity market with fixed prices exhibits a block angular structure with rank m+n−1:

p1 p2 . . . pm
p1 p2 . . . pm
. . .
p1 p2 . . . pm
I I . . . I
 x =

p1e
1
1 + . . .+ pme
1
m
p1e
2
1 + . . .+ pme
2
m
...
p1e
n
1 + . . .+ pme
n
m
e1 + . . .+ en
 , (1)
where p1, . . . , pm are relative prices between commodities, e
i = (ei1, . . . , e
i
m)
T , and x =
(x11, . . . , x
1
m, . . . , x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
m)
T . The constraints matrix of (1) could also be written as
(
I ⊗ P
1⊗ I
)
,
where P = (p1, p2, p3, . . . , pm) and ⊗ is the Kronecker product between two matrices. Note
that the linking constrains (i.e., the conservation of commodities (1 ⊗ I)x = e1 + . . . + en)
are implied by the balance equations of a network flow among the agents. This fact will be
analyzed in Section 5, where we introduced costs associated to the flow.
All the feasible allocations lay in a (m + n − 1) dimensional hyperplane defined by the
prices (always containing at least one solution, which is represented by the vector of initial
endowments e), and restricted to the fact that agents are rational: ui(x) ≥ ui(e, for i ∈ A
Proposition 1 below shows that an asymptotic approximation of an upper bound of the
number of nonnegative solutions of (1) is O(n(mb)bm ), where b is the average amount of each
commodity, i.e., b =
∑m
j=1(
∑n
h=1 e
h
j )
m .
Proposition 1. Let Λ be the set of nonnegative solutions of (1), i.e., the allocation space of
a problem of bargaining integer amounts of m commodities among n agents with fixed prices.
If the allocation space satisfies the mild conditions bj =
∑n
h=1 e
h
j ≥ n and bj ∈ O(n), j =
1, . . . ,m (where bj is the overall amount of commodity j in the system), then |Λ| ∈ O(n(mb)bm ).
Proof. The set of nonnegative solutions of (1) is a subset of the union of bounded sets, as
Λ ⊂ ⋃mj=1{(x1j . . . xnj ) ∈ Rn : x1j + . . . + xnj = e1j + . . . + enj ;x1j . . . xnj ≥ 0}. Therefore, Λ
is a finite set, as it is the intersection between Z and a bounded subset of Rmn. Let Λ′ be
the set of nonnegative solutions of (1), without considering the price constraints, i.e., the n
diagonal blocks p1x
h
1 + p2x
h
2 + . . .+ pmx
h
m = p1e
h
1 + p2e
h
2 + . . .+ pme
h
m, for h = 1, . . . , n. We
know that |Λ′| ≥ |Λ|. However, |Λ′| can be easily calculated, as the number of solutions of
m independent Diophantine equations with unitary coefficients. The number of nonnegative
integer solutions of any equation of the form
∑n
h=1 x
h
j = bj , j = 1, . . . ,m, might be seen as the
number of distributions of bj balls among m boxes:
(n+bj−1)!
(n−1)! bj ! . Since we have m independent
Diophantine equations of this form, then the number of possible solutions for all of them
is
∏m
j=1
(n+bj−1)!
(n−1)! bj ! . Thus, we know that |Λ| ≤
∏m
j=1
(n+bj−1)(n+bj−2)...n
bj !
≤ ∏mj=1 (n+bj−1)bjbj ! ≤∏m
j=1(n+bj−1)bj
bm , where the last inequality holds because bj ≥ n ≥ 2. Since bj ∈ O(n) we have
that
∏m
j=1(n+bj−1)bj
bm ∈ O(n
(mb)
bm ). Hence, |Λ| ∈ O(n
(mb)
bm ).
In the next section we define a barter process of integer quantities of m commodities
among n agents as a local search in the allocation space Λ (obtained as a sequence of
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elementary reallocations) and show that the Pareto frontier of the ERP might be analytically
obtained without the use of any iterative procedure.
3. The sequence of elementary reallocations
As previously seen, the linear system characterizing the space of possible allocations is (1).
Here the conservation of commodity (i.e., the overall amount of commodity of each type must
be preserved) is generalized to include arbitrary weights in the last m rows of (1). Based
on this observation consider the following multi-objective integer non-linear optimization
problem (MINOP)
max [ui(x), i = 1, . . . , n] (2a)
s. to
P
P
. . .
P
d1I d2I . . . dnI
 x =

b1
b2
...
bn
b0
 (2b)
ui(x) ≥ ui(e) i = 1 . . . , n
x ∈ Zmn ≥ 0, (2c)
where ui : Rmn → R, P ∈ Q1×m, di ∈ Q, bi ∈ Q, i = 1, . . . , n, and b0 ∈ Qm. The conditions
ui(x) ≥ ui(e), i = 1 . . . , n, guarantee that no agent gets worse under a feasible reallocation,
which is known in general bargaining literature as the disagreement point. The constraint
matrix has a primal block-angular structure with n identical diagonal blocks involving m
decision variables. Problem (1) is a particular case of (2) for di = 1, i = 1, . . . , n.
From a multi-objective optimization point of view, a suitable technique to generate the
Pareto frontier of (2) is the ε-constraint method, as proposed by Haimes, Lasdon and Wis-
mert [12]. Recently, Ozlen and Azizoglu [16] developed a general approach to generate
all nondominated objective vectors, by recursively identifying upper bounds on individual
objectives using problems with fewer objectives.
3.1. The elementary reallocation problem
In everyday life, barter processes among people tends to achieve the Pareto frontier of
problem (2) by a sequence of reallocations. We consider a process based on a sequence of
two-commodity-two-agent reallocations, denoted as SER. Any step of this sequence requires
the solution of a MINOP involving 4 variables and 4 constraints of problem (2).
Let e be a feasible solution of (2b) and (2c) and suppose we want to produce a feasible
change of 4 variables, such that 2 of them belong to the ith and jth position of the diagonal
block h and the other belong to the ith and jth position of the diagonal block k.
It can be easily shown that a feasibility condition of any affine change of these 4 variables
ehi + ∆
h
i , e
k
i + ∆
k
i , e
h
j + ∆
h
j , e
k
j + ∆
k
j is that ∆
h
i ,∆
k
i ,∆
h
j ,∆
k
j must be an integer solution of the
following system of equations
pi pj 0 0
0 0 pi pj
dh 0 dk 0
0 dh 0 dk


∆hi
∆hj
∆ki
∆kj
 =

0
0
0
0
 . (3)
4
The solution set are the integer points in the null space of the matrix of system (3), which
will be named A. A is a two-agent-two-commodity constraint matrix, and its rank is three
(just note that the first column is a linear combination of the other three using coefficients
α2 =
pi
pj
, α3 =
dh
dk
and α4 = − pidhpjdk ). Therefore the null space has dimension one, and its
integer solutions are found on the line
∆hi
∆hj
∆ki
∆kj
 = q

pjd
k
−pidk
−pjdh
pid
h
 , (4)
for some q = αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh), where α ∈ Z and F : Q4 → Q provides a factor which trans-
forms the null space direction in the nonzero integer null space direction of smallest norm.
We note that this factor can be computed as F (pi, pj , d
k, dh) = G(pjd
k, pid
k, pjd
h, pid
h),
where
G(vi =
ri
qi
, i = 1, . . . , l) =
lcm(qi, i = 1, . . . , l)
gcd(lcm(qi, i = 1, . . . , l) · vi, i = 1, . . . , l) , (5)
ri and qi being the numerator and denominator of vi (qi = 1 if vi is integer), and lcm and
gcd being, respectively, the least common multiple and greatest common divisor functions.
Hence, given a feasible point e, one can choose 4 variables, such that 2 of them belong
to the ith and jth position of a diagonal block h and the others belong to the ith and jth
position of a diagonal block k, in m(m−1)n(n−1)/4 ways. Each of them constitutes an ERP,
whose Pareto frontier is in e+null(A). The SER is a local search, which repeatedly explores a
neighborhood and chooses both a locally improving direction among the m(m−1)n(n−1)/4
possible ERPs and a feasible step length q = αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh), α ∈ Z. For problems of the
form of (2) the SER might be written as follows:
xt+1 = xt + αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)

...
pjd
k
...
−pidk
...
−pjdh
...
pid
h
...

...
h, i
...
h, j
...
k, i
...
k, j
...
= xt + αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)∆khij , (6)
t being the iteration counter. In shorter notation, we write (6) as xt+1 = xt + αSkhij , where
Skhij = F (pi, pj , d
k, dh)∆khij (7)
is a direction of integer components. Since the nonnegativity of x have to be kept along the
iterations, then we have that
−
max
{
xhi /(pjd
k), xkj /(pid
h)
}
F (pi, pj , dk, dh)
≤ α ≤
min
{
xhj /(pid
k), xki /(pjd
h)
}
F (pi, pj , dk, dh)
, (8)
or, equivalently,
−max
{
xhi /(pjd
k), xkj /(pid
h)
}
≤ q ≤ min
{
xhj /(pid
k), xki /(pjd
h)
}
. (9)
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(The step length is forced to be nonnegative when the direction is both feasible and a descent
direction; in our case the direction is only known to be feasible, and then negative step lengths
are also considered.)
An important property of an elementary reallocation is that under the assumptions that
∂uk(x)
∂xki
: Rmn → R is (i) non increasing, (ii) nonnegative and (iii) ∂u
k(x)
∂
xji
= 0 for j 6= k (i.e.,
uk only depends on xk ), which are quite reasonable requirements for consumer utilities, then
uk(x + αSkhij ) is a unimodal function with respect to α, as shown by the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Under the definition of uk and Skhij , for every feasible point x ∈ Rmn,
uk(x + αSkhij ) is a unimodal function with respect to α in the interval defined by (8).
Proof. Let us define g(α) = uk(x + αSkhij ), differentiable with respect to α. It will be shown
that for all α in the interval (8), and 0 < τ ∈ R, g′(α) < 0 implies g′(α + τ) < 0, which is
a sufficient condition for the unimodality of g(α). By the chain rule, and using (6) and (7),
the derivative of g(α) can be written as
g′(α) = ∇xuk(x + αSkhij )Skhij
= F (pi, pj , d
k, dh)
(
∂uk(x + αSkhij )
∂xki
(−pjdh) +
∂uk(x + αSkhij )
∂xkj
pid
h
)
.
(10)
If g′(α) < 0 then, from (10) and since F (pi, pj , dk, dh) > 0, we have that
∂uk(x + αSkhij )
∂xki
pjd
h >
∂uk(x + αSkhij )
∂xkj
pid
h. (11)
Since from (6) the component (k, i) of Skhij is F (pi, pj , d
k, dh)(−pjdh) < 0, and ∂u
k(x)
∂xki
is non
increasing, we have that for τ > 0
∂uk(x + (α+ τ)Skhij )
∂xki
≥ ∂u
k(x + αSkhij )
∂xki
. (12)
Similarly, since the component (k, j) of Skhij is F (pi, pj , d
k, dh)(pid
h) > 0, we have
∂uk(x + αSkhij )
∂xkj
≥ ∂u
k(x + (α+ τ)Skhij )
∂xkj
. (13)
Multiplying both sides of (12) and (13) by, respectively, pjd
h and pid
h, and connecting the
resulting inequalities with (11) we have that
∂uk(x + (α+ τ)Skhij )
∂xki
pjd
h >
∂uk(x + (α+ τ)Skhij )
∂xkj
pid
h,
which proofs that g′(α+ τ) < 0.
Using Proposition 2 and the characterization of the space of integer solutions of (3), we
are able to derive a closed expression of the Pareto frontier of the ERP, based on the behavior
of u(x + αSkhij ) (see Corollary 1 below), as it is shown in this example:
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Figure 1: Plots of g1(α) and g2(α), and interval of α associated to the Pareto frontier. The disagree-
ment point corresponds to g1(0) and g2(0), the utilities in the current iterate.
Example 1. Consider the following ERP with initial endowments [40, 188, 142, 66].
max [2− e−0.051x11 − e−0.011x12 , 2− e−0.1x21 − e−0.031x22 ]
s. to
5x11 + 10x
1
2 = 2080
5x21 + 10x
2
2 = 1370
5x11 + 6x
2
1 = 1052
5x12 + 6x
2
2 = 1336
2− e−0.05x11 − e−0.01x12 ≥ 1.68
2− e−0.1x21 − e−0.031x22 ≥ 1.50
xij ≥ 0 ∈ Z i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2;
(14)
The utility functions g1(α) = u1(x + αS1212) and g
2(α) = u2(x + αS1212) are
g1(α) = u1(x + αS1212) = u
1


40
188
142
66
+ α

12
−6
−10
5

 = 2− e−0.051(40+12α) − e−0.011(188−6α)
g2(α) = u2(x + αS1212) = u
2


40
188
142
66
+ α

12
−6
−10
5

 = 2− e−0.1(142−10α) − e−0.031(66+5α),
which are plotted in Figure 1. The continuous optimal step lengths for the two respective agents
are argmax g1(α) = 3.33 and argmax g2(α) = 8.94. Due to the unimodality of uk(x + αShkij ), all
efficient solutions of (14) are given by integer step lengths α ∈ [3.33, 8.94] (see Fig. 1), i.e., for
α ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} we have
g1(4) = 1.82412 g1(5) = 1.81803 g1(6) = 1.80882 g1(7) = 1.79752 g1(8) = 1.78465,
g2(4) = 1.93043 g2(5) = 1.94035 g2(6) = 1.94873 g2(7) = 1.95558 g2(8) = 1.96057.
Due to the unimodality of both utility functions with respect to α, no efficient solution exists for an
α outside the segment [3.33, 8.94].
The above example illustrates a case where the segment between argmax uh(x + αSkhij )
and argmax uk(x+Skhij ) contains five integer points, associated with the feasible step lengths.
7
The following statements give a constructive characterization of the Pareto frontier of an
ERP for the case of concave utility function and linear utility functions respectively.
Corollary 1. Let Γ be the set of integer points in the interval [adown, aup], where adown =
min{argmaxαuk(x + αSkhij ), argmaxαuh(x + αSkhij )} and aup = max{argmaxαuk(x + αSkhij ),
argmaxαu
h(x + αSkhij )}, and let[αdown, αup] be the interval of feasible step lengths defined in
(8). Then, due to Proposition 2, the set V∗ of Pareto efficient solutions of an ERP can be
obtained as follows:
i. V∗ = {[uh(x + αSkhij ), uk(x + αSkhij )] : α ∈ Γ} if Γ is not empty and does not contain
the zero.
ii. If Γ is empty and there exists an integer point between 0 and adown but no integer point
between aup and αup then V∗ contains the unique point given by [uh(x + αSkhij , uk(x +
αSkhij )]such that α is the greatest integer between 0 and a
down.
iii. If Γ is empty and there exists an integer point between aup and αup but no integer
point between 0 and adown then V∗ contains either the unique point given by [uh(x +
αSkhij , u
k(x + αSkhij )] such that α is the smallest integer between a
up and αup, or α = 0,
or both of them if they do not dominate each other. (In this case the three possibilities
must be checked, since if for only one of the utilities —let it be h, for instance— uh(x) >
uh(x + α¯Skhij ), α¯ being the smallest integer between a
up and αup, then both values 0 and
α¯ are Pareto efficient.)
iv. If Γ is empty and there are integer points both between aup and αup and between 0 and
adown then V ∗ contains the points given by [uh(x + αSkhij , u
k(x + αSkhij )] such that α is
either the smallest integer between aup and αup, or the greatest integer between 0 and
adown, or both points if they do not dominate each other.
v. In the case that Γ contains the zero, then no point dominates the initial endowment x,
so that the only point in the Pareto frontier is x.
Corollary 2. Consider the case of an economy where agents have linear utility functions with
gradients c1, . . . , cn and let again Γ be the set of integer points in the interval [adown, aup],
where adown = min{argmaxααckSkhij , argmaxααchSkhij } and aup = max{argmaxααckSkhij ,
argmaxααc
hSkhij }, and let [αdown, αup] be the interval of feasible step lengths defined in (8).
It might be easily seen that either Γ = Q or Γ = ∅. The set Γ = Q in the case (chi pjdk −
chj pid
k) and (ckj pid
h − cki pjdh) have opposite sighs, whereas Γ = ∅ if (chi pjdk − chj pidk) and
(ckj pid
h − cki pjdh) have the same sign. Then, due to Proposition 2, the set V∗ of Pareto
efficient solutions of an ERP may contain at most one point:
i. if there is at least one non-null integer between −max{xhi /(pjdk), xkj /(pidh)}/F (pi, pj , dk, dh)
and min{xhj /(pidk), xki /(pjdh)}/F (pi, pj , dk, dh) and Γ = ∅, then V∗ only contains the
unique point corresponding to the allocation xt+1 = xt +αSkhij for a step-length α which
is either equal to −max{xhi /(pjdk), xkj /(pidh)}/F (pi, pj , dk, dh) (if (chi pjdk−chj pidk) and
(ckj pid
h−cki pjdh) are negative) or for equal to min{xhj /(pidk), xki /(pjdh)}/F (pi, pj , dk, dh)
(if (chi pjd
k − chj pidk) and (ckj pidh − cki pjdh) are positive).
ii. V∗ only contains the disagreement point in the opposite case.
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Having a characterization of the Pareto frontier for any ERP in the sequence allows not
just a higher efficiency in simulating the process but also the possibility of measuring the
number of non dominated endowments of each of the m(m − 1)n(n − 1)/4 ERPs, which
might be used as a measure of uncertainty of the process. Indeed, the uncertainty of a
barter process of this type might come from different sides: i) how to choose the couple of
agents and commodities in each step? ii) which Pareto efficient solution of each ERP to use
to update the endowments of the system? In the next subsection we shall study different
criteria for answering the first two questions.
Note that the set of non-dominated solutions of the ERP, obtained by the local search
movement (6) might give rise to imbalances between supply and demand, as described by
Dreze [9] for the continuous case. To resolve this imbalance Dreze introduce a quantity
rationing, which can by also extended to the ERP.
We define a rationing scheme for the ERP as a pair of vectors l ∈ Zm, L ∈ Zm, with
L ≥ 0 ≥ l, such that for a specified vector of relative prices P ∈ Zm, the allocation space is
redefined by introducing in (1) the additional constraints li ≤ xi − ei ≤ Li, for i = 1, . . . , n,
where ei and xi are n−dimensional vectors associated to the initial endowment and to
the allocation of the ith commodities among the n agents respectively; li and Li are the i
th
components of l and L respectively. Since in each ERP the vector xt is the current allocation
at the tth interaction, a local rationing scheme might be defined li ≤ xt+1i − xti ≤ Li. Thus,
for two given agents h and k and two given commodities i and j we have
li ≤ αF (pi, pj , dk, dh)

...
pjd
k
...
−pjdh
...

≤ Li, lj ≤ αF (pi, pj , dk, dh)

...
−pidk
...
pid
h
...

≤ Lj , (15)
which only requires to introduce two additional inequalities to the range of feasible step-
length:
− Li
F (pi, pj , dk, dh) min {pjdh, pidk} ≤ α ≤ −
li
F (pi, pj , dk, dh) max {pjdh, pidk} , (16a)
li
F (pi, pj , dk, dh) min {pjdk, pidh} ≤ α ≤
Li
F (pi, pj , dk, dh) max {pjdk, pidh} . (16b)
An open problem, which is not investigated in this paper, is the formulation of equilib-
rium conditions for this rationing scheme. One possibility might be the construction of two
intervals for l and L which minimize the overall imbalances, under the conditions that (16)
is verified in each ERP, as long as l and L are inside the respected intervals. The integrality
of the allocation space Λ forbids a straightforward application of the equilibrium criteria
proposed by Dreze [9] to the markets we are considering in this work.
3.2. Taking a unique direction of movement
The sequence of elementary reallocations formalized in (3) requires the iterative choice of
couples of agents (h, k) and couples of commodities (i, j), i.e., directions of movement among
the m(m−1)n(n−1)/4 in the neighborhood of the current solution. If we this choice is based
on a welfare function (summarizing the utility functions of all the agents), the selection of
of couples of agents and couples of commodities can be made mainly in two different ways:
first improving and best improving directions of movement.
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The best improving direction requires an exhaustive exploration of the neighborhood.
Noting that each direction of movement in the current neighborhood constitutes a particular
ERP, a welfare criterion might be the uncertainty of each elementary reallocation, measured
by the number of points in the Pareto frontier of ERPs, as described in the previous sub-
section. A usual welfare criterion is a norm of the objective vector (e.g., Euclidean, L1 or
L∞ norms). Also the average marginal rate of substitution could represent an interesting
criterion to select the direction of movement as a high marginal rate of substitution suggests
a kind of mismatch between preferences and endowments.
If at iteration t an improving direction exists the respective endowments are updated in
accordance with the solution of the selected ERP: for each couple of commodities (i, j) and
each couple of agents (h, k), agent k gives αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)pjd
k units of i to agent h and
in return he/she gets αF (pi, pj , d
k, dh)pid
k units of j, for some α ∈ Z. At iteration t + 1,
a second couple of commodities and agents is considered in accordance with the defined
criterion. If we use a first improving criterion, the process stops when the endowments keep
in status quo continuously during m(m− 1)n(n− 1)/4 explorations, i.e., when no improving
direction is found in the current neighborhood.
3.3. Observing the paths of all improving directions of movement
When simulating social systems it might be interesting to enumerate all possible stories
which are likely to be obtained starting from the known initial point. In this subsection we
introduce a method to enumerate possible paths exclusively based on the Pareto efficiency
of each elementary reallocation.
The idea is to solvem(m−1)n(n−1)/4 ERPs and keep all the efficient solutions generated.
If in a given iteration we have r non-dominated solutions, and observe li ≤ m(m− 1)n(n−
1)/4, for i = 1, . . . , r, Pareto improving directions, with fi,j for j = 1 . . . li efficient solutions
for each of them, we would expect some of the r +
∑r
i=1
∑li
j=1 fi,j solutions to be non-
dominated by some others and the incumbent should be updated by adding to the r previous
solutions those which are non-dominated and removing those which are dominated by some
other. From the point of view of a local search, the incumbent solution of this process is not
a unique point in the allocation space but a collection of points which Pareto-dominate the
initial endowment and do not dominate each other.
This procedure requires a method to find Pareto-optimal vectors each time m(m−1)n(n−
1)/4 ERPs are solved. Corley and Moon [7] proposed an algorithm to find the set V ∗ of
Pareto vectors among r given vectors V = {v1, v2, . . . , vr}, where vi = (vi1, vi2, . . . , vin) ∈ Rn,
i = 1, 2, . . . , r. Sastry and Mohideen [20] observed that the latter algorithm is incorrect and
presented a modified version. In our implementation of the the best-improve barter process,
we use the modified Corley and Moon algorithm of [20], shown below.
Step 0. Set V∗ = Ø.
Step 1. Set i = 1, j = 2.
Step 2. If i = r − 1, go to Step 6. For k = 1, 2, . . . , n, if vjk ≥ vik, then go to Step 3; else, if
vik ≥ vjk, then go to Step 4; otherwise, go to Step 5.
Step 3. Set i = i+ 1, j = i+ 1; go to Step 2.
Step 4. If j = r, set V∗ = V∗ ∪{vi} and vj = {∞,∞, . . . ,∞} go to Step 3; otherwise, set vjk = vrk,
where k = 1, 2, . . . , n. Set r = r − 1 and go to Step 2.
Step 5. If j = r, set V∗ = V∗ ∪ {vi} go to Step 3; otherwise, set j = j + 1 and go to Step 2.
Step 6. For k = 1, 2, . . . , n, if vjk ≥ vik, then set V∗ = V∗ ∪ {vj} and stop; else, if vik ≥ vjk, then
set V∗ = V∗ ∪ {vi} and stop. Otherwise, let V∗ = V∗ ∪ {vi, vj}. Return V∗.
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The nice property of the modified Corley and Moon algorithm is that it doesn’t necessarily
compare each of the r(r − 1)/2 couples of vectors for each of the n components. This is
actually what the algorithm do in the worst case, so that the complexity could be written
as O(nr2), which is linear with respect of the dimension of the vectors and quadratic with
respect to the number of vectors. For the case of linear utilities, the next subsection provides
a small numerical example and the pseudo-code of the procedure used to enumerate the paths
of all possible stories.
3.4. Linear utilities
In microeconomic theory the utility functions are rarely linear, however the case of linear
objectives appears particularly suitable from an optimization point of view and allows a
remarkable reduction of operations, as the ERPs cannot have more than one Pareto-efficient
solution (see Corollary 1).
Consider a given direction of movement Skhij . We know that a feasible step length α
belongs to the interval defined by (8). Since in the case of one linear objective the gradient
is constant, for any direction of movement (i, j, k, h) the best Pareto improvement (if there
exists one) must happen in the endpoints of the feasible range of α (let αdown(i, j, k, h) and
αup(i, j, k, h) denote the left and right endpoints of the feasible range of α, when the direction
of movement is (i, j, k, h)). Therefore, the line search reduces to decide either αdown(i, j, k, h),
αup(i, j, k, h) or none of them. Then for every given point x, we have a neighborhood of at
most m(m − 1)n(n − 1)/2 candidate solutions. The pseudo-code to generate all sequences
of elementary reallocations for n linear agents, keeping the Pareto-improvement in each
interaction, is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Generating paths of all improving directions of movement
1: Initialize the endowments E = < e1, . . . , en > and utilities U = < u1, . . . , un >.
2: Initialize the incumbent allocations E˜t = {E} and the incumbent utilities U˜ t = {U}.
3: repeat
4: for x ∈ E˜t do
5: Let < Sx, Gx > be the set of movements and utilities {(x + αSkhij , cT (x + αSkhij ))} for each
couple of commodities and agents (i, j, k, h) and α ∈ {αdown(i, j, k, h), αup(i, j, k, h)}
6: end for
7: Let < S,G >=
⋃
x∈E˜ < Sx, Ux >
8: Let < S,G >= CorleyMoon(< S,G >)
9: Let E˜t+1 = E˜t ∪ S and U˜ t+1 = U˜ t ∪G
10: until E˜t = E˜t−1
The function CorleyMoon() applies the modified Corley and Moon algorithm to a set
of utility vectors and allocation vectors and returns the Pareto-efficient utility vectors with
the associated allocations.
Despite the idea behind the SER is a process among self-interested agents, which are
by definition local optimizers, this algorithm could also be applied to any integer linear
programming problem of the form of (2) with one linear objective: u(x) = cTx. In this case
however the branch and cut algorithm is much more efficient even for big instances, as we
will show in the next section.
If a first-improve method is applied, an order of commodities and agents is required when
exploring the neighborhood and the equilibrium allocation might be highly affected by this
order (path-dependence). The pseudocode of algorithm 2 describes the first improve search
of the barter algorithm applied to the case of one linear objective function.
Note that if the nonnegativity constraints are not taken into account, problem (2) is
unbounded for linear utility functions. This corresponds to the fact that without lower
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bounds the linear version of this problem would make people infinitely get into debt. As a
consequence, the only possible stopping criterion, when the objective function is linear, is
the fulfillment of nonnegativity constraints, i.e. a given point x is a final endowment (an
equilibrium of the barter process) if we have that for any direction of movement and for any
given integer α if cT (x+αSkhij ) > c
Tx then x+αSkhij has some negative component. In some
sense the optimality condition is now only based on feasibility.
Algorithm 2 First-improve SER with linear utility function
1: Initialize the endowments E = < e1, . . . , en > and utilities U = < u1, . . . , un >.
2: Let t = 0;
3: Let (i, j, k, h) be the tth direction in the order set of directions;
4: if cT (x+αdown(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) > c
T (x+αup(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) and c
T (x+αdown(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) > c
T (x)
then
5: Update the incumbent x = x+ αdown(i, j, k, h)Skhij and GOTO 3;
6: else if cT (x + αup(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) > c
T (x + αdown(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) and c
T (x + αup(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) >
cT (x) then
7: Update the incumbent x = x+ αup(i, j, k, h)Skhij ) and GOTO 3;
8: else
9: t = t+ 1;
10: if t < m(m− 1)n(n− 1) then
11: GOTO 4;
12: else
13: RETURN
14: end if
15: end if
3.5. The final allocation and the convergence of the SER
For the case of continuous commodity space and exogenous prices, Feldman [11] proved
that as long as all agents are initially endowed with some positive amount of a commod-
ity, pairwise optimality implies global optimality. Unfortunately, the SER described in
this paper does not necessarily lead to Pareto efficient endowments. Let Tx(α) = x +∑
k 6=h
∑
i 6=j α(i, j, k, h)S
kh
ij , representing a simultaneous reallocation ofm commodities among
n agents, with step length αkhij for each couple of commodities ij and agents hk, starting
from x ∈ Λ. Whereas a SER is required to keep feasibility along the process, a simultaneous
reallocation Tx(α) of m commodities among n agents does not consider the particular path
and any feasibility condition on the paths leading from x to Tx(α). Hence, remembering that
all SERs described in this section stop when no improving elementary reallocation exists in
the current neighborhood, we can conclude that the non existence of a feasible improving
ER does not entail the non existence of an improving simultaneous reallocation of m com-
modities among n agents. In this sense a SER provides a lower bound of any sequence of
reallocations of more than two commodities and two agents at a time.
Axtell [4] studied sequences of k-lateral trades with local Walrasian prices and observed
that the convergence to the equilibrium is linear. A similar reasoning could be applied to
the SER.
Proposition 3. The rate of convergence of the SER is linear.
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function U(t) =
∑n
i=1 u
i(xt), associating a real value to each
point in the allocation space [23]. As U(t) increases monotonically along the SER (6) and
the allocation space is a finite set, then limt→∞ U(t) = U∗.
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Since each iteration of the SER makes at least one agent strictly better off without
producing any change in the others, then U(t + 1) > U(t) and |U
∗−U(t+1)|
|U∗−U(t)| = r < 1 for all t
sufficiently large.
4. Bartering on networks
An important extension of the problem of bargaining integer amounts of m commodities
among n agents with fixed prices is to define a network structure such that trades among
agents are allowed only for some couples of agents who are linked in this network. In this
case the conservation of commodities d1x1 + d2x2 + · · · + dnxn = d1e1 + d2e2 + · · · + dnen
is replaced by balance equations on a network, so that the final allocation of commodity i
must verify Ayi = D(xi − ei), where yi is the flow of commodity i in the system, A is the
incidence matrix, and D is a n×n diagonal matrix containing the weights of the conservation
of commodity i, that is D = diag(d1 . . . dn) (for more details on network flows problems see
[1]).
It is also possible for the final allocation to have a given maximum capacity, that is, an
upper bound of the amount of commodity i that agent h may hold: xhi ≤ x¯hi .
The variables of the problem are now xhi , which again represent the amount of commodity
i hold by agent h, shi which are the slack variables for the upper bounds, and y
h,k
i which are
the flow of commodity i from agent h to agent k.
The objective functions u˜i(x,y) , i = 1 . . . n, might depend on both the final allocation x
and the interactions y, since the network topology could represent a structure of geographical
proximity and reachability.
The resulting mathematical programming formulation of the problem of bargaining in-
teger commodities with fixed prices among agents on a network with upper bounds on the
final allocations is as follows:
max [u˜i(x,y), i = 1, . . . , n] (17a)
s. to
P
. . .
P
I I
. . .
. . .
I I
A
D . . .
A

 xs
y
 =

b1
...
bn
x¯1
...
x¯n
b0

(17b)
ui(x,y) ≥ ui(e,0) i = 1 . . . , n
x ∈ Zmn ≥ 0, y ∈ Zmn(n−1) ≥ 0,
(17c)
where u˜i : Rmn → R, P ∈ Q1×m, D ∈ Qmn×mn, bi ∈ Q, i = 1, . . . , n, A ∈ Qn×n(n−1), and
b0 ∈ Qnm. Matrix D is an appropriate permutation of the diagonal matrix made of m copies
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of the matrix D with the weights of the conservation of commodity and u˜i(e,0) is the utility
function of agent i evaluated in the initial endowments e with null flow.
Problem (2) had mn variables and m+n constraints, whereas problem (17) has mn(n+1)
variables and n(1 + 2m) constraints. When a SER is applied, the definition of a network
structure and the application of upper bounds to the final allocation reduce the number of
feasible directions of movement in each iteration and the bound of the interval of feasible
step length, as for any incumbent allocation x, the step length α must be such that 0 ≤
x + αSkhij ≤ x˜.
The effect of network structures on the performance of a barter process has been previ-
ously studied by Bell [5] and by Wilhite [25], for the case of endogenous prices and continuous
commodity space. In this case the process takes into account how agents update prices each
time they perform a bilateral trade. Reasonably, prices should be updated based either on
the current state of the only two interacting agents or on the state of the overall population
or also on the history of the system, such as previous prices. Bell showed that centralized
network structures, such as a stars, exhibit a faster convergence to an equilibrium allocation.
It must be noted that any sequence of bilateral trades intrinsically gives rise to a network
structure generated by the set of couples of agents interacting along the process. Such a
structure might be statistically analyzed in term of its topological properties, as it is done
in the next section with a battery of problems of different sizes.
5. Computational results
We have already seen that a SER can also be applied to any integer linear programming
problem of the form (2), where the individual utilities are aggregated in a single welfare
function. If this aggregated welfare is defined as a linear function of the endowments of the
form u(x) = cTx, the comparison of the SERs with the standard branch and cut algorithm
is easily carried out. Considering the ERP as the basic operation of a SER and the simplex
iteration as the basic operation of the branch and cut algorithm, the comparison between
the two methods is numerically shown in Table 1 for three replications of 11 problems with
the same number of agents and commodities, which amounts to 33 instances. The branch
and cut implementation of the state-of-the-art optimization solver Cplex was used.
In the special case of a unique linear utility function a system of many local optimizers
(agents) could be highly inefficient if compared with a global optimizer, who acts for the
“goodness” of the system, as in the case of branch and cut. Also the increase of elementary
operations of the barter process is much higher than the one of the branch and cut, partic-
ularly when the direction of movement is selected in a best-improve way, as it is shown in
Tab. 1. Each point is averaged over the three instances for each size (m,n). The economical
interpretation suggests that if the time taken to reach an equilibrium is too long, it is possible
that this equilibrium is eventually never achieved since in the meanwhile many perturbing
events might happen.
As we discussed in Section 4, any SER intrinsically gives rise to a network structure
generated by the set of couples of agents interacting along the process. Such a structure
might be statistically analyzed in term of its topological properties. We consider two kind
of assortativity measure (the preference for an agent to interact with others that are similar
or different in some way, often operationalized as a correlation between adjacent node’s
properties):
i. couples of agents with highly different marginal utilities are more often commercial partners
(negative Pearson correlation between the Euclidean distance of marginal utilities and the number
of interactions of each couple of agents, cor(‖ch, ck‖2, interactions(h,k))),
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size initial welfare
first-improve best-improve branch and cut
neighborhood ERPs solution ERPs solution simplex solution
10 75.134 0.66 267 353.269 91 365.126 87 394.630
10 147.958 0.84 271 763.188 91 767.371 12 769.861
10 1.205.972 0.77 375 3.925.921 74 3.844.165 70 4.060.685
15 297.713 0.70 1.343 1.455.839 215 1.471.387 49 1.488.149
15 326.996 0.71 1.090 2.544.271 237 2.554.755 63 2.614.435
15 625.800 0.71 806 2.640.317 224 2.644.008 76 2.684.016
20 183.573 0.67 2.759 3.432.832 378 3.425.665 110 3.525.421
20 1.064.023 0.81 1.582 4.197.757 361 4.194.187 94 4.331.940
20 201.377 0.78 2.629 1.017.906 351 1.089.860 80 1.180.977
25 228.365 0.89 4.358 2.221.790 648 2.226.152 237 2.271.552
25 687.492 0.65 2.806 3.416.982 572 3.403.937 113 3.462.043
25 323.495 0.61 4.706 2.262.657 666 2.245.817 50 2.474.429
30 973.955 0.79 6.648 5.428.473 975 5.427.207 101 5.377.843
30 1.811.905 0.82 13.126 8.945.605 1.084 8.953.611 127 9.080.651
30 1.302.404 0.85 12.089 7.583.841 957 7.573.400 132 7.605.525
35 653.739 0.87 13.201 3.456.918 1.310 3.458.570 112 3.474.126
35 564.905 0.80 8.772 3.579.713 1.308 3.585.815 77 3.599.639
35 753.056 0.83 14.199 5.132.226 1.290 5.107.933 67 5.333.123
40 482.570 0.87 16.307 2.429.707 1.608 2.428.731 145 2.446.953
40 430.174 0.68 7.885 5.281.060 1.640 5.229.740 90 5.279.631
40 2.795.862 0.79 14.240 19.175.278 1.578 14.503.963 186 19.276.444
45 3.392.010 0.98 62.398 22.681.229 2.300 22.664.443 162 22.728.195
45 842.645 0.92 12.900 6.606.875 2.137 6.642.397 204 6.755.016
45 1.909.859 0.97 48.688 15.979.841 2.173 15.865.744 180 16.071.407
50 839.559 0.93 20.615 4.822.082 2.105 4.859.830 137 4.895.655
50 718.282 0.97 20.744 3.586.560 2.459 3.588.633 160 3.610.194
50 1.570.652 0.99 58.165 18.872.864 2.530 19.018.519 180 19.069.868
55 351.051 0.98 20.344 2.761.203 2.935 2.748.862 1.242 2.799.187
55 413.656 0.96 26.780 4.566.394 2.922 4.569.975 336 4.585.475
55 551.355 0.99 32.053 5.136.295 3.139 5.135.647 253 5.157.444
60 468.575 0.99 27.208 1.941.409 3.568 1.949.786 271 1.995.930
60 501.366 0.99 34.323 5.051.429 3.521 5.051.836 313 5.067.154
60 575.950 0.98 43.227 4.751.072 3.589 4.747.097 273 4.801.179
Table 1: Numerical results of the SER and Branch and Cut for different instances of problem (2). The first
column shows the number of agents and commodities of the problem. Columns ’ERPs’ provide the number
of elementary reallocations and column ’neighborhood’ shows the proportion of neighborhood which has been
explored. Columns ’solution’ give the maximum total utility found. Column ’simplex’ gives the number of
simplex iterations performed by branch and cut.
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Size
First-improve Best-improve
Type i Type ii Type iii Type i Type ii Type iii
10 0.40 0.48 0.63 0.70 0.67 0.74
10 0.46 0.66 0.61 0.85 0.63 0.74
10 0.60 0.48 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.75
15 0.49 0.28 0.64 0.74 0.48 0.56
15 0.44 0.52 0.59 0.58 0.44 0.67
15 0.37 0.60 0.54 0.56 0.74 0.66
20 0.22 0.36 0.49 0.39 0.62 0.54
20 0.33 0.53 0.48 0.54 0.48 0.55
20 0.053 0.30 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.42
25 0.37 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.66 0.53
25 0.33 0.63 0.40 0.65 0.56 0.66
25 0.32 0.43 0.56 0.48 0.70 0.49
30 0.10 0.28 0.33 0.42 0.55 0.53
30 0.07 0.30 0.39 0.56 0.62 0.68
30 0.33 0.42 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.65
35 0.27 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.59 0.43
35 0.26 0.33 0.56 0.46 0.55 0.48
35 0.13 0.40 0.47 0.46 0.58 0.53
40 0.20 0.37 0.36 0.44 0.64 0.38
40 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.68 0.52 0.64
40 0.40 0.44 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.60
45 0.10 0.13 0.45 0.62 0.60 0.54
45 0.29 0.45 0.51 0.57 0.59 0.58
45 0.20 0.23 0.52 0.58 0.57 0.68
50 0.17 0.26 0.37 0.35 0.55 0.32
50 0.21 0.28 0.50 0.45 0.62 0.42
50 0.15 0.30 0.42 0.51 0.50 0.65
55 0.14 0.53 0.17 0.39 0.52 0.38
55 0.17 0.33 0.38 0.29 0.53 0.44
55 0.19 0.37 0.38 0.47 0.56 0.43
60 0.35 0.45 0.60 0.54 0.57 0.62
60 0.20 0.30 0.43 0.34 0.50 0.52
60 0.16 0.38 0.29 0.39 0.51 0.48
Table 2: Three types of network assortativity.
ii. agents who are more sociable (trade more often) interact frequently with agents who are not
sociable (negative Pearson correlation between the Euclidean distance of couples of agents with
respect to their number of interactions and the number of joint interactions of each couple,
cor(‖degreeh, degreek‖2, degree(h,k))),
iii. the more two agents are different with respect to their marginal utilities, the more they are
different with respect to their number of interactions(negative Pearson correlation between the
Euclidean distance of marginal utilities and the number of interactions of each couple of agents,
cor(‖ch, ck‖2, ‖degreeh, degreek‖2))
For the same instances in Tab. 1, Tab. 2 reports the the corresponding assortativities.
This interaction pattern is far from been random and, in the case the barter process is
forced to be performed only among agents adjacent in a network, it suggests that highly
dissortative structure match pretty well with the best-improve directions of movement, so
that none of them is penalized by the network structure.
6. Summary and future directions
We studied the use of barter processes for solving problems of bargaining on a discrete
set, representing markets with indivisible goods and fixed exogenous prices. We showed that
the allocation space is characterized by a block diagonal system of linear constraints, whose
structural properties might be exploited in the construction and analysis of barter processes.
Using Proposition 2 and the characterization of the space of integer solutions of the ERP,
16
we were able to derive a constructive procedure to obtain its Pareto frontier, as shown by
Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
Further research on this topic should include the characterization of the integer points
in the null space of a general reallocation problem with fixed prices to obtain a closed form
solution of a general problem of reallocating integer amounts of m commodities among n
agents with fixed prices.
An open problem, which has not been investigated in this paper, is the formulation of
equilibrium conditions for this rationing scheme proposed in Section 3, as suggested by Dreze
[9] for the case of continuous allocation space.
In Section 4 we proposed a mathematical programming model for the problem of real-
locating integer amounts of m commodities among n agents with fixed prices on a sparse
network structure with nodal capacities. Further research on this issue should include a
mathematical properties of a SER in dealing with markets with sparsely connected agents,
as formulated in (17).
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